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Runnette: Judicial Discretion and the Homosexual Parent

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE HOMOSEXUAL
PARENT: HOW MONTANA COURTS ARE AND
SHOULD BE CONSIDERING A PARENT'S SEXUAL
ORIENTATION IN CONTESTED CUSTODY CASES
Deirdre Larkin Runnette*
I.

INTRODUCTION

My grandmother taught me how to bake bread, how to
prune trees, and how to keep snails from the garden. She made
jam, always, at the first hint of fall. At the end of each summer I
went home with a box full of jam marked with masking tape
labels. In her death, I remember those jars and the captured
smell of summer that she sent home with me. Such memories
may be uncommon in a law review article. However, these memories are relevant not only to me, but to Montana law as well for
the question my grandmother's life presented.
My grandmother was a lesbian. When she fell in love with
another woman, my grandfather would not allow a divorce. He
wanted no one to know that his wife was a lesbian. Further, he
wanted no such mother for his children. He said that he would
fight for custody if she ever left him. In anticipation, he had
affidavits signed and kept in his safe. These were his bargaining
chips to keep her in the marriage. With these, he told her, he
could prove her lesbianism. Because of these, he claimed, a court
would find her unfit to care for her children. If she left, he told
her, he would call upon a court to find the same.1
In 1952, my grandmother's life presented a question: how
should courts consider a parent's sexual orientation in contested
custody cases? Today, in 1996, this question is still definitively
unanswered. In some jurisdictions, a parent's sexual orientation
is viewed as a detriment to the child;2 in others, a parent's sexu* The author wishes to thank Professor Bari R. Burke for her honesty, her
unfailing humor, her critical vision and her tremendous patience with each draft and
every hesitation, Professor Carl Tobias for his time and criticism, and Co-Editor in
Chief Christopher Flann for his generous time, insight and support. Without any of
this assistance, this comment would have been an impossibility; and for this assistance, I am indebted.
1. Beth Brandt draws an analogy between the pain felt by Native American
women whose children were taken from them and sent to English speaking schools
under the authority of the state, and lesbian mothers who have lost their children
under the authority of the judicial system because of their sexual orientation. Beth
Brandt, A Long Story, in POLITICS OF THE HEART, A LESBIAN PARENTING ANTHOLOGY

31 (Sandra Pollack & Jeanne Vaughn eds., 1987). The author thanks Professor Melody Graulich for finding and sharing Brandt's story.
2. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that liv-

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

1

178

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 57
[1996], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 57

al orientation is irrelevant unless it is proven to adversely affect
the child.' Depending upon the jurisdiction, the answer changes.
Courts generally decide custody cases by considering what
their state legislatures determine to be in the "best interest of
the child."4 This standard requires that judges compare parents'
respective abilities to care and provide for their children by considering a list of enumerated factors.' Many observers criticize
this standard.6 As a result, some jurisdictions have moved to, or

ing with homosexual mother could potentially endanger the child's physical, mental,
moral or emotional health); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1277 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that when a child's gender identity is being formed and the mother's
homosexuality is known, the father should have greater custodial time); T.C.H. v.
K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "Missouri case law
recognizes that a parent's homosexuality can never be kept private enough to be a
neutral factor in the development of a child's values and character."); Roberts v.
Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ohio App. 1985) (stating that "the state has a substantial interest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual behavior which threatens
the social fabric, and in endeavoring to protect minors from being influenced by those
who advocate homosexual lifestyles."); see also Myriam Marquez, Nice, New Wife Does
Not Make Convicted Killer a Better Parent, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 2, 1996, at A10,
for an excellent example of such cases at the district court level. Ms. Marquez specifically responds to a Florida district court case in which a father, previously convicted
for killing his ex-wife, was awarded custody instead of the lesbian mother so that
the child might "be given the opportunity and the option to live in a nonlesbian
world." Lesbian Appeals Child's Custody to Convicted Murderer Dad The Case May
Be Florida's First Chance to Rule on Whether Sexual Orientation Should Affect Custody, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 1, 1996, at Al.
3.
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
4.
Virtually every state has adopted the best interest standard by statute. See,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994) (stating that determinations shall be made
in the "best interest of the child"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, § 5/602 (Smith-Hurd
1994) (stating that "[t]he court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child"); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.2. (Vernon Supp. 1994) (stating that
"[tihe court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-3 (West 1994) ("[T]he court shall determine temporary
custody in the best interest of the child.").
5.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, § 5/602 (Smith-Hurd 1994):
(a) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest
of the child. The court consider all relevant factors including: (1) the wishes
of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the
child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his parent or parents, his siblings and any other person who
may significantly affect the child's best interest; (4) the child's adjustment
to his home, school and community; (5) the mental and physical health of
all individuals involved; and (6) the physical violence or threat of physical
violence by the child's potential custodian, whether directed against the
child or against other persons; (7) the occurrence of ongoing abuse as defined in § 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, whether directed against the child or directed against other persons; and (8) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.
6.
See, e.g., Mary Becker, Judicial Discretion in Child Custody: The Wisdom of
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now consider, a primary caretaker preference that restricts a
court's broad authority to compare the contesting parents. 7 Instead, this preference authorizes courts to compare parents only
to determine which parent bore the primary day-to-day responsibility for the child.8
However, both the "best interest of the child" standard and
the primary caretaker preference evaluate parents. Under either
standard, when faced with parents of similar ability, courts
should award custody to the parent who satisfies a majority of
the positive factors taken into consideration. In reaching this
decision, judges hold and exercise considerable discretion.9 This
is appropriate considering the unique situations which exist in
every family. Ideally, this discretion is "bounded by the rules and
principles of law, and [is] not arbitrary, capricious or unrestrained." °
Yet, when one parent differs from traditional notions of
parental characteristics, a judge may negatively consider this
difference while evaluating the parent, regardless of whether the
parent's difference actually affects the child." Considering such
Solomon?, 81 ILL. B.J. 650 (1993) (discussing judicial abuse of discretion under the
"best interest of the child" standard and advocating for limitations on judicial discretion); Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in all the Wrong Places: Resolving
Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (1994) (discussing
the indeterminacy of the "best interests" standard and its inadequacy for protecting
children's rights).
7. West Virginia has explicitly moved to this primary caretaker preference.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (detailing the primary caretaker
preference). Minnesota had adopted the primary caretaker preference judicially in
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985) (citing Garska, supra, and adopting
the primary caretaker presumption), but in 1989 the legislature amended Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17.1 to incorporate the primary caretaker preference into the "best interest of
the child" standard as a another factor to consider within this standard. See In re
the Marriage of Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 220-221 (Minn. 1990) for a
complete discussion of this change in law.
8.
For a discussion of this standard, see David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d
912 (W. Va. 1989) discussed infra notes 90-95.
9. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the
UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215 (1991) (discussing the history
of judicial discretion generally and its positive use in the in the "best interest of the
child" standard). But see Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery:
Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARiz. L. REV. 11, 61-63 (1994) for a feminist
critique of judicial discretion in the "best interest of the child" standard.
10.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466-67 (6th ed. 1990).
11. Fitzgerald criticizes the "best interest of the child" standard stating:
The "best interests of the child" standard invites the same race, class, and
cultural bias upon judicial interpretation as child abuse and neglect statutes. In custody disputes between parents, the "best interest" standard also,
of course, invites gender bias. Courts have denied custody to one mother
because she earned less money than her "good looking" husband, to another
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difference, especially when it does not affect the child, is an
improper exercise of judicial discretion. Such impropriety is predicated upon a judge's individual bias and represents an abuse of
judicial discretion. This type of abuse does not occur in every
case, but it happens with enough frequency to disadvantage
parents who differ from the majority. 2
Homosexual parents are a reality for six to fourteen million
children in the United States. 3 Some of these homosexual parents are the single fathers raising 5,371 children and the single
mothers raising 19,416 children in our state. 4 Already, these
parents are in our courtrooms fighting for custody of their children.15 However, despite the growing presence of a homosexual
population in our state, 16 no state supreme court precedent

because she became a Jehovah's witness, and to another because she married interracially. Indeed, the family law bar in every locale quickly ascertains the biases of different judges, knowing that the luck of the draw of
judge more than any other factor may determine the outcome of a custody
case.
Fitzergald, supra note 9, at 62 (citations and footnotes omitted). The bias Fitzgerald
discusses extends to gay and lesbian parents. See, e.g., David M. Rosenblum, Custody
Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1665 (1991) (detailing common
misconceptions surrounding gay and lesbian parents and how these can affect court
decisions). This bias is even more egregious when one considers the empirical evidence which indicates that a there is little difference between the psychological and
social functions of heterosexuals and homosexuals. See generally Gregory M. Herek,
Myths About Sexual Orientation:A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAW
& SExuALITY 133 (1991) (surveying recent psychological studies on the differences
between heterosexuals and homosexuals); David K Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families:
Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1994)
(detailing common assumptions regarding homosexual parents and comparing these
with the scientific realities which indicate that one parent's sexual orientation does
not affect their parenting ability nor present a detriment to the child).
12. Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 61-63; see also Steve Susoeff, Assessing
Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 856-862 (1985) (discussing judicial discretion in
custody determinations under the "best interest of the child" standard when gay or
lesbian parents are involved); Rosenblum, supra note, 11, at 1665.
13. Flaks, supra note 11, at 345.
14. Telephone interview with Dave Martin, Montana Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Aug 13, 1994.
15. The author conducted a survey of the 37 judicial districts in Montana. Responses indicate that custody disputes involving homosexual parents have been heard
in at least 13 districts. Since not every district responded to this survey, the results
do not speak for the whole state, nonetheless, the survey provides valuable information. Survey of Montana District Court Judges (on file with the author). Further, one
parent's homosexuality may remain an unspoken issue in child custody cases.
Telephone interview with Susan Leaphart, Special Master for Family Law Proceedings, Montana's Fourth Judicial District, Missoula, Montana (Aug. 4, 1995).
16.
In 1995 an estimated 600 gay and lesbian people marched through Helena
in the second annual Gay Pride march and celebration. Donn Forward, Montana's
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guides our courts on the issue of gay and lesbian parents. Iv
Currently, the standards Montana courts use to evaluate gay
and lesbian parents are broad enough to allow for abuses of
judicial discretion. In other jurisdictions that use these same
custody standards, such abuses of discretion are evident.18 Although there is no appellate record of these cases in our own
state, it is clear from other jurisdictions that gay and lesbian
parents are particularly susceptible to such abuses of judicial
discretion. Accordingly, courts in Montana must recognize the
need to curtail such abuses. This paper shall demonstrate, specifically, how our courts can curb such abuse by considering a
parent's sexual orientation only when a contesting parent proves
a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and harm to the
child.
Section two of this paper details how courts in other jurisdictions use the "best interest of the child" standard and the primary caretaker preference when considering a parent's sexual orientation in contested custody cases. Section three then discusses
these custody tests as courts currently employ them in Montana.
Gay Pride Celebration a Big Success!, pride nooz, Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1995 at 2.
In this past year, Montana has seen the gestation of Montana's first gay, lesbian and
bisexual political action organization, Pride! Inc., formed exclusively to give political
voice to Montana's homosexual population. pride nooz, Vol. 2, No.1, Jan. 1995. Further presence of a gay and lesbian community is evident in the constitutional challenge of Montana's Deviate Sexual Conduct Statute (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505
(1995)). The Lewis and Clark district court held the statute unconstitutional under
the right to privacy afforded by the Montana Constitution in Article II, Section 10.
Further, although the plaintiffs asked for no remedy, the court ordered a permanent
injunction against prosecution under the statute. Gryczan v. State, No. BDV-93-1869
(Lewis & Clark County, Feb. 16, 1996). In addition, in the 1995 Montana Legislative
session there was an attempt to revise the Montana Human Rights Act to include
sexual orientation as a protected class against discrimination. H.R. 388, 54th Cong.,
Regular Sess. (1995). The growing acceptance of Montana's gay and lesbian population was evident in the national outcry that followed the passage of H.B. 157 that
added convicted homosexuals to the list of sex offenders who had to submit to lifetime registration. H.B. 157, 54th Cong., Reg. Sess. (1995). See, e.g., David W.
Dunlap, Montana Cuts Homosexual Acts From List of Registered Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1995, at A12; Montana Kills Gay Category in Sex Offense Bill, L.A_ TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1995, at A23; Shannon Tangonan, Montana Bill Seeks Registration of Gays,
Mar. 23, 1995, USA TODAY, at 1A; After Outcry, Montana Senate Drops Proposal
Aimed Against Gays, Mar. 24, 1995, CHI. TRIB., at §1, p. 1 0 .
17.
Montana's lack of reported cases is not uncommon, as most custody cases
never go beyond the trial level in any state. David S. Dooley, Immoral Because
They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of
Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 395 (1990).
18.
See infra part II.A-B for a discussion of abuses of judicial discretion in
other jurisdictions using the "best interest of the child" standard. For an explanation
of the abuses of discretion in a jurisdiction using the primary caretaker preference,
see infra part II.C.
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Section four examines one case in which a Montana district court
abused the broad discretion allowed under the "best interest of
the child" standard. In addition, section four details how the
Montana Supreme Court implicitly required a nexus to curtail
the abuse of judicial discretion that occurred in that case at the
trial court level. Section five then demonstrates how the Montana Supreme Court's implicit requirement of a nexus can be
applied to cases involving homosexual parents. Finally, section
five also shows how this nexus requirement can be used to curb
abuse of judicial discretion by providing our courts with a test to
determine when courts should consider a parent's sexual orientation under the "best interest of the child" standard.
II. CHILD CUSTODY STANDARDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

A. Best Interest of the Child Standard: The Requirement of a
Nexus
Many legislatures adopted the "best interest of the child"
standard in an attempt to move away from the "tender years"
doctrine (which favored the mother) and toward a more gender
neutral standard.' The "best interest of the child" standard
allows courts to compare the relative abilities and circumstances
of parents to determine which parent is best able to care for the
child. Although this standard is ostensibly more gender-neutral,
feminist criticism of this standard has been unremitting."
Some feminist critics argue that the "best interest of the
child" standard tends to favor the parent with greater financial
security.2 Generally, courts using this standard will prefer the
parent who can provide the more "stable" environment, defining
this environment in terms of job history or economic considerations that are more apt to favor men.22 Ironically, critics point
out, it is often the woman's commitment to the caretaking of the

19. See Michael Grossber, Balancing Acts: Crisis Change, and Continuity in
American Family Law, 1890-1990. 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 287-307 (1995) (discussing
the emergence and the historical move away from the tender years doctrine).
20. See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 61-63; see infra, notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
21. MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1991): "[N]on-nurturing
factors assume importance which often favor men. For example, men are normally in
a financially better position to provide for children without the necessity of childsupport transfers or the costs of starting a new job that burdens many women." Id.
at 91.
22.
Becker, supra note 6, at 651.
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child that limits her ability to work. 23 In addition, some suggest
this standard tends to overlook the parent who bore the primary
caretaking responsibilities prior to the dissolution of the relationship.24 One observer concludes:
[Niot only is it unfair to mothers to award custody to fathers
because the fathers have not made the investment in their
children that their wives have, but it is likely to be bad for
children, who are likely to do best in the continued custody of
their primary caretaker.25
Further, critics attack the highly discretionary nature of this
standard.2 6 Some suggest that these "judgments about what is
best for children are as much the result of political and social
judgments about what kind of society we prefer as they are
about children."27 A judge exemplifies this criticism when he or
she allows personal beliefs regarding homosexuality to color his
or her evaluation of the contesting parents. In such cases, this
subjective evaluation, rather than the parent's actual abilities,
may become the basis for denying the homosexual parent custody of his or her children.
2
an Illinois case, clearly demonIn re Marriage of Pleasant,
strates such use of the "best interest of the child" standard: the
trial court judge in that case found "[t]hat the [Mother] expresses
[sic] the inability to dissociate herself with known lesbians during periods of visitation, [consequently it] is not in the best interest of the minor child [to allow for unsupervised visitation], because it would seriously endanger the child's mental and moral
well being."29 In the trial court judge's memorandum for the
court order, he included a section entitled 'HOMO SEXUALITY,'
that was based on a book that was neither introduced into evidence nor even mentioned during the trial proceedings."
In contrast, the appellate court applied the "best interest of
the child" standard and determined that the mother's sexual

23.
Becker, supra note 6, at 651.
24. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Paternal Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615, 616 (1992) (discussing methods of determining custody and advocating for a new standard that more accurately reflects the child's reality).
25. Id. at 616.
26. See Kathleen T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 303
(1988).
27. Id. at 303; see Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 61-63.
28. 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. 1993).
29. In re Marriage of Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 643.
30. Id. at 642.
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orientation was not a relevant consideration for the trial court
without proof that it directly harmed the child.3 Further, the
appellate court found that, although the trial court specifically
referred to the "best interest of the child" throughout its opinion,
the decision rested entirely upon the mother's sexual orientation.32 The differing responses of the trial court and the appellate court evidence the wide discretion afforded to courts in jurisdictions that use the "best interest of the child" standard.
Moreover, the trial court opinion indicates how this discretion
can be abused. The trial court judge focused not on the mother's
ability to care for her child, but on his evaluation of the mother's
sexual orientation.
When the appellate court required a causal link between a
parent's sexual orientation and harm to the child, it applied
what others refer to as a nexus requirement or standard." This
requirement makes a parent's sexual orientation relevant only
when there is a clear connection-or nexus-demonstrated between the parent's sexual orientation and harm to the child.'
Thus, when courts require a nexus, a custody decision cannot be
based upon a presumption of harm that is predicated upon an
individual judge's belief about homosexuality. Instead, a court
must consider a parent's sexual orientation only when the party
alleging harm has proven that the parent's sexual orientation
adversely affects the child.35
Requiring a nexus does not preclude the "best interest of the
child" standard. In fact, a nexus requirement can complement
this standard. In Blew v. Verta,3" a Pennsylvania court rescinded a prohibition on a lesbian mother's visitation, illustrating
such a complementary use. In the court's opinion, it stated:
The standard "best interest of the child" requires us to consider
the full panoply of a child's physical, emotional, and spiritual
well-being. Of primary importance to the child's well-being is
the child's full and realistic knowledge of his parents, except
where it can be shown that exposure to the parents is harmful
to the child .... In [this child's] case, one of life's realities is

31. Id. at 642.
32. Id.
33. LAURA BENKOV, PH.D., REINVENTING THE FAMILY, THE EMERGING STORY OF
LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS. 45 (1994); see also Dooley, supra note 17 at 395, 407-414
(discussing judicial approaches to gay and lesbian parents in contested custody cases).
34. BENKOV, supra note 33, at 45.
35. Id.
36. 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1992).
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that one of his parents is homosexual. In the absence of evidence that the homosexuality in some way harms the boy, limiting [the child's] relationship with that parent fails to permit
him to confront his life situation, however unconventional it
may be ....

The trial court itself concluded there was "no ques-

tion that the mother and [her partner] both care for the boy,
have good parenting skills and have his best interest at
heart."3 7
In this instance, the court applied the "best interest of the child"
standard in conjunction with a nexus requirement. Consequently, the court evaluated only the factors relevant to each parent's
ability to care and provide for their child. By so narrowing the
court's evaluation, the use of a nexus requirement facilitated the
court's custody decision.
Currently, other jurisdictions use a nexus requirement to
curb abuses of judicial discretion.38 Conkel v. Conkel exemplifies
such use. 9 The opinion in that case recognizes the emergence of
the nexus requirement in other jurisdictions and articulates the
rationale for its use in cases involving homosexual parents. In
that case, a mother appealed a trial court decision granting a
bisexual father overnight visitation with his two sons.4 The
mother feared that contact with the boys' father would trigger
homosexual tendencies in the boys, that the children would contract AIDS, and that they would be subject to "the slings and
arrows of a disapproving society."4 1
Although the appellate court recognized the genuine nature
of the mother's concerns, the court still considered only the
parent's conduct that was proven to adversely affect the child.42
The appellate court stated "[w]hatever their faults, unless the
married parent's conduct is harming the child, the courts will not
intervene in the parent child relationship."' The appellate
court then considered each of the mother's allegations and the
evidence offered to support them:
1) [The mother] expresses "fear" that contact with their
father will trigger homosexual tendencies in the two boys. No
evidence was presented to support this contention. This court

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Blew, 617 A.2d at 35-36.
See infra note 54.
509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 983.
Id. at 986-987.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 985-986.
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takes judicial notice that there is no consensus on what causes
homosexuality, but there is substantial consensus that being
raised by a homosexual parent does not increase the likelihood
that a child will become homosexual."
2) The appellant mother also indicates being "petrified"
that the children will contract AIDS. Certainly, an incurable
terminal illness is a frightening prospect. However, no evidence
was presented that the father in the case is seropositive with
HIV or has AIDS or ARC. AIDS or other HIV-associated diseases are not contracted by casual household contact.45
3) Finally, the appellant mother argues that increased
visitation will subject the children to the "slings and arrows of
a disapproving society." This court fails to see why the extension of visitation would exacerbate this issue. The children will
have to come to terms with the fact that their father is homosexual. In a similar case [citation omitted], a New Jersey appellate court noted that changing custody would not remove the
source of stigma and potential embarrassment. The New Jersey
court left the children with their homosexual parent and postulated a beneficial effect for the children, i.e., overcoming "the
constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice."'
The Ohio appellate court also stated, "[t]his court cannot
take into consideration the unpopularity of homosexuals in society when its duty is to facilitate and guard a fundamental parent-child relationship."4 7 In this statement, the court relied upon Palmore v. Sidoti," in which the Supreme Court recognized
that:
[A child might] be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses
not present if the child were living with parents of the same
racial or ethnic origin ... [however] ... [t]he Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
44. Id. at 986 (relying on Dr. Richard Green, Professor of Psychiatry, State
University of New York at Stony Brook, an expert on gender identity in children,
who has said that, "[n]o theory in the developmental psychology literature suggests
that having homosexual parents leads to a homosexual outcome. Rather, heterosexual
parents raise pre-homosexual children."); see also Richard Green, M.D., The Best
Interests of the Child with a Lesbian Mother, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 7,
at 9 (1982) (discussing in greater depth his studies of gender identity in children).
45. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 987 (citing Gerald H. Friedland et al., Lack of Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or
AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED., 344 (1986).

46. Id. at 986 (citing M.P. v. S. P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979)).
47. Id. at 987.
48. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.49
The appellate court also relied upon an Alaska decision °
which explicitly set out its requirement for proof of a nexus between a parent's behavior and harm to the child."' With the
support of such precedent in other jurisdictions and the evidence
presented at the trial court level, the Ohio Appellate Court held
that the evidence presented did not support the proposition that
the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding the bisexual
father overnight visitation.52 Absent proof of a nexus between
the father's bisexual conduct and harm to the child, neither the
trial court nor the appellate court would consider the father's
bisexuality as a factor in their custody determination."
By requiring a nexus between a parent's sexual orientation
and harm to the child, courts in these cases, and in similar cases
in other jurisdictions, refuse to make custodial evaluations that
are based solely upon one parent's sexual orientation. 4 A nexus

49. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
50. S.N.E. v. R.L.B. 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
51. Id. at 878 ("We have often endorsed the requirement that there be nexus
between the conduct of the parent relied on by the court and the parent-child relationship."). The Alaska court explained this nexus requirement as follows:
For example, that a mother is living with another man in an adulterous relationship does not justify denying her custody absent any indication of adverse affect on that child. Nor does bearing children out of
wedlock or instability in relationships warrant a custody change where the
parent's conduct does not adversely affect the child or the mother's
parenting abilities. Even the mental health of the custodial parent is "relevant only insofar as it has or can be expected to negatively affect the
child."
In marked contrast to the wealth of testimony that Mother is a lesbian, there is no suggestion that this has or is likely to affect the child
adversely. The record contains evidence showing that the child's development to date has been excellent, that Mother has not neglected him, and
that there is no increased likelihood that a male child raised by a lesbian
would be homosexual. Simply put, it is impermissible to rely on any real or
imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's status as a lesbian.
Id. at 879 (footnote and citations omitted).
52. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that "no evidence had been presented of any adverse effect upon the
children of her [mother's] homosexuality," and that, "the Court does not believe the
evidence, on balance, established the existence of a present adverse effect upon the
children . . . ."); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding
that minor child is "very comfortable" in his lesbian mother's home and "has not
been tormented by his friends in regard to his mother's lifestyle."); Benzio v.
Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the trial court
finding "that a lesbian household would adversely affect the child to be without basis
in the record"); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)
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requirement, restricts the scope of judicial consideration in custody cases to behavior that adversely affects the child. When judicial consideration is so restricted, gay and lesbian parents can be
assured that custody decisions will reflect the "best interest of
the child" rather than a response to that parent's sexual orientation.
B. Problems with the Nexus Requirement in Other Jurisdictions
The coupling of a nexus requirement with the "best interest
of the child" standard, however, is not enough to render custody
decisions immune from judicial bias. While some courts5 5 use a
nexus requirement to constrain abuses of judicial discretion,
other courts use a broader application that legitimizes the consideration of a wide range of information. This broad application
undermines the usefulness of a nexus requirement to constrain
judicial discretion. In S.E.G. v. R.A.G.5", the Missouri Court of
Appeals, which was informed by the 'best interest of the child"
standard57 and a nexus requirement, held that a lesbian mother
should not be awarded custody of her children on the basis of her
sexual orientation. At the trial court level, the mother attempted to counter the allegation that she posed a threat to the
children. With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union,
the mother cited articles that indicated there were no significant
differences between heterosexual and homosexual parents. 8

(holding that the lesbian mother should be awarded custody and postulating that the
children will "emerge better equipped to search out their own standards of right and
wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral
judgments, and better able to understand the importance of conforming their beliefs
to the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the constraints of currently
popular sentiment or prejudice"); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1986) (holding
that a nexus test should be applied, whereby "the homosexuality of a parent should
only be an issue insofar as the parent's sexual orientation can be proven to have
harmed the child.") (citing Riveria, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law In the MidEighties, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 330 (1986)); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525
N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (holding that the parent's conduct must be shown to have
some harmful effect on the children and that the "[plersonal conceptions of morality
held by the members of this Court have no place in the resolution of this controver-

sy").
55. See supra note 54.
56. 735 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (1986).
58. Id. at 166; see also, Flaks, supra note 11, at 395; Herek, supra note 11, at
133; David J. Kleber et al., The Impact of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody
Cases: A Review of the Literature, 14 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 81 (1986)
(detailing current data regarding studies of children raised in homes with gay or
lesbian parents); David Cramer, Gay Parents and Their Children: A Review of Re-
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However, at the trial court level, this evidence was not considered credible." And, at the appellate level, the court stated:
Since it is our duty to protect the moral growth and the best
interest of the minor children, we find the Wife's arguments
lacking. Union, Missouri is a small, conservative community
with a population of about 5,500. Homosexuality is not openly
accepted or widespread. We wish to protect the child from peer
pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they may encounter
as a result of the "alternative lifestyle" their mother has chosen.6

Although the appellate court recognized that the lesbian mother
was a loving and caring parent and that one of the children
preferred to live with his mother,6 ' the court ultimately found
that the mother's conduct could "never be kept private enough to
be a neutral factor in the development of a child's values and
character."6 2
In conclusion, the appellate court noted:
We are not presuming that the Wife is an uncaring mother.
The environment, however, that she would choose to rear her
children in is unhealthy for their growth. She has chosen not to
make her sexual preference private but invites acknowledgment
and imposes her preference upon her children and her community. The purpose of restricting visitation is to prevent extreme
exposure of the situation to minor children."
Despite the supplementation of the "best interest of the
child" standard with a nexus requirement, the appellate court
focused solely upon the mother's sexual orientation.' In this
narrow focus, the court seems to have taken judicial notice of the
town's characteristics and the social stigma that might follow a

search and Practical Implications, 64 J. CouNs. DEv. 504, 506 (1986) (concluding
upon review of recent studies that "[tihe gay parent is a living statement of the
concept of difference, and society and the legal system have not to date recognized
the strengths and abilities of these mothers and fathers."); Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian
Mothers, Psychosocial Assumptions in Family Law, AM. PSYCHOL., June 1989, at 941
(rebutting the assumptions that "lesbian women are emotionally unstable or unable
to assume a maternal role" and "the assumption that their children are likely to be
emotionally harmed, subject to molestation, impaired in gender role development, or
themselves homosexual").
59. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 165.
60. Id. at 165.
61. Id. at 167.
62. Id. at 166.
63. Id. at 167.
64. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 167.
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child raised by a homosexual parent in that community. Thus,
the father did not meet the nexus requirement. He did not present evidence that proved that the mother's sexual orientation
actually harmed their children. Instead, the appellate court presumed this harm in a three-fold process. First, the trial court
found that the mother's evidence was not credible. Then, both
the trial and appellate court presumed that Union, Missouri is a
small and intolerant town and took judicial notice of this "fact."
Finally, the trial court denied the mother custody because of this
"fact." Similarly, this "fact" controlled the appellate court's review of that decision.
A similar presumption of harm is evident in T.C.H. v.
KM.H.6", from the same court, two years later. In that case, the
appellate court held:
The parties have not referred us to any case which holds that a
homosexual parent is per se unfit to have custody of minor
children. Nor has our research disclosed any. Rather, the rule
appears to be that "[t]here must be a nexus between harm to
the child and the parent's homosexuality." Here the trial court
found "that the relationship is having an ill-effect on the morality of the children and will continue to effect their well being in
the future."6 6
The court in T.C.H., as in S.E.G., presumed harm to the
child through a similar three step process. First the trial court
found that the mother's evidence that she presented no threat to
her children was not credible.67 Further, the court gave no credence to the children's' desire to continue living with their
mother8 8 and gave little consideration to the findings of psychologists and social workers who testified that the mother would be
the better custodian.69 Then, the trial court presumed that "a
parent's homosexuality can never be kept private enough to be a
neutral factor in the development of a child's values and character"7 ° and took judicial notice of this "fact." Finally, the trial
court relied upon this "fact" in making its custody decision. Similarly, the appellate court relied upon this "fact" when it affirmed
the trial court's decision.

65.
66.
Ct. App.
67.
68.
69.
70.

784 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
T.C.H., S.W.2d at 284 (citing S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo.
1987).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 285.
Id. (quoting G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).).
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In both of these cases, the court used presumptions rather
than proven facts to satisfy a nexus requirement. This use of
presumptions instead of proof indicates that just as the "best
interest of the child" standard can be subject to abuses of judicial
discretion, a nexus requirement can be similarly abused. To use
a nexus requirement effectively, courts must be aware of the
type of evidence presented, distinguishing between facts proven
by evidence and facts that are presumed. This heightened awareness extends to judicial notice, forcing courts to reconsider
whether such notice is predicated upon bias or presumptions.
When misconceptions regarding homosexuality and homosexual
parents abound,7 1 it is critical that courts using a nexus requirement do not defeat it by accepting faulty presumptions
instead of facts proven by the evidence presented.
The Supreme Court, in Palmore v. Sidoti,72 indicated that
such presumptions have no place in our courtrooms. In that case,
a Caucasian woman married a African-American man and the
woman's ex-husband, the father of the child, sought to modify
custody in light of these changed conditions.7 3 The trial court
found that both parents were similar in "devotion to the child,
[the] adequacy of housing facilities, [and the] respectability of
the new spouse of either parent."74
However, the trial court disregarded the evidence of the
mother's parenting ability and seems to have taken judicial notice of the presumed "fact" that society would react negatively to
a child raised in an inter-racial home. This "fact" then became
the controlling factor in the custody decision. Consequently, the
trial court held that it was in the "best interest of the child" to
award custody to the father, sparing the child the social stigmatization that would come from the mother's inter-racial marriage.75
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court recognized the racism that
exists in our country, stating:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic
prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminated. There is a risk that a child living
with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety
of pressures and stresses not present if the child were living
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430.
Id.
Id. at 431.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

15

Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 7

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin.76
Further, the Court recognized the trial court "was entirely candid and made
no effort to place its holding on any other ground
77
than race."

In contrast, the Supreme Court refused to consider the presumed "fact" of hostility toward inter-racial marriages as a controlling factor in a custody decision. The Court held that "the
reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict
[are not] permissible considerations for removal of an infant
child from the custody of its mother."78 Further, the Court stated that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 79 Thus,
according to the Supreme Court in Palmore, when the trial court
presumed that a child in an inter-racial home might be subject
to hostility and took judicial notice of this "fact," the trial court
gave legal effect to private biases.
To ensure that courts do not give effect to private racial
biases, the Supreme Court in Palmore excluded "private biases
and the possible injury they might inflict" ° from judicial consideration. If courts are to heed Palmore, they can no longer presume that the private biases which exist in a larger society will
result in harm to children. Moreover, courts can neither take
judicial notice of these "facts" nor allow these presumed "facts" to
control custody decision. To follow the Supreme Court decision in
Palmore, the scope of judicial consideration must be restricted to
a parent's behavior as it directly affects his or her children.
This same narrow scope of consideration is evident in both
the Alaska and Ohio decisions in which similar allegations of
societal disapproval were raised.8 1 In both cases, the courts considered only the effect of the parent's sexual orientation upon the
child. Moreover, in both cases courts applied the "best interest of
the child" standard in conjunction with a nexus requirement. By
supplementing the "best interest of the child" standard with a
nexus requirement, the courts in Ohio and Alaska narrowly
focused judicial consideration and evaluated only the parents'
behaviors as they affected their children.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 432.
Id.
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 432.
See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, broadening a nexus requirement, as in S.E.G.
and T.C.H., to accommodate presumptions of the private biases
that might reside in any given community undermines the nexus
requirement and detracts from its ability to contain abuses of
judicial discretion. Further, such a wide application of a nexus
requirement allows courts to "give effect" to the very "private
biases" the Supreme Court in Palmore prohibited."
C. The Primary CaretakerPreference
Given the sharp criticism of the "best interest of the child"
standard, some states are moving toward a "primary caretaker
preference."83 This preference allows courts to acknowledge the
role of the primary caretaker prior to the dissolution of the relationship and favors this "primary" parent in custody determinations." Thus, parental involvement with the child, rather than
financial security, serves as the basis for custody." By
grounding this preference in specific criteria, the legislatures
adopting this preference also attempt to contain the discretion
found in the "best interest of the child" standard.86 However,
82. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). As in S.E.G., some argue that these private biases create a climate of fear which no child should grow up in. However, recent studies indicate that this fear of harm, though very real, is often exaggerated in the day
to day life of children of homosexual parents. See David Cramer, Gay Parents and
Their Children: A Review of Research and PracticalImplications, 64 J. COUN. & DEV.
504, 505 (1986) for a discussion of recent findings which show that only 3 out of 27
children of lesbian mothers recalled being teased by peers regarding their mother's
sexuality. Conversely, he points out some studies have shown that at adolescence
children can become more sensitive to peer comments and 79% of children from gay
parents received negative messages from their peers about their parent's sexuality;
see also, Susoeff, supra note 12, at 877-878 (discussing the seriousness of anti-gay
prejudice and stating that intense anti-gay prejudice can justify denial of custody in
individual cases where children have actually suffered harassment and choose not to
live with a gay or lesbian parent; he also indicates that limited research shows that
only 5% of children who live with openly gay or lesbian parents have been harassed
by other children, concluding that recognizing the problem of anti-gay harassment
does not mean that custody should be routinely denied without evidence of actual
harm).
83.
See David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989) for an excellent discussion of the "primary caretaker" standard and its use in other jurisdictions.
84. Scott, supra note 24, at 617.
85. See, e.g., David M., 385 S.E.2d at 912.
86.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). The criteria to determine
which parent has been the primary caretaker is listed as follows:
1) preparing and planning of meals; 2) bathing, grooming and dressing; 3)
purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; 4) medical care, including nursing
and trips to physicians; 5) arranging for social interaction among peers after
school, i.e., transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy
scout meetings; 6) arranging alternative care, i.e., babysitting, day-care; 7)
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just as the necessary discretion in the "best interest of the child"
standard can be abused, the primary caretaker preference can
fall prey to similar improper uses.
In jurisdictions that use the primary caretaker preference
standard, courts ask two questions: 1) which parent was the
primary caretaker; and 2) whether this parent is fit. 7 Unlike
the first question of this standard which is strictly enumerated
and qualified,88 the second question offers one highly discretionary factor: a parent's fitness. In West Virginia, a parent's fitness
is measured by the following test:
To be a fit parent, a person must: 1) feed and clothe the child
appropriately; 2) adequately supervise the child and protect
him or her from harm; 3) provide habitable housing; 4) avoid
extreme discipline, child abuse and other similar vices; and 5)
refrain from immoral behavior under circumstances that would
affect the child.89
In David M. v. Margaret M., the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals detailed the historic abuse of judicial discretion
that has plagued this standard:
[A]lthough the primary caretaker rule as described [sic] appears to have been followed, the primary caretaker was denied
custody through a broad interpretation of the fitness requirement. We have noted that our very narrow exception to the
primary caretaker rule has of late developed a voracious appetite which, if left unchecked, will allow it to eat the rule. We
write today to reaffirm and clarify the benefits of the primary
caretaker parent rule to assist the family law masters and the
circuit courts ....90

putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
waking child in the morning; 8) disciplining, i.e., teaching general manners
and toilet training; 9) educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc. and, 10)
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
87.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson 415 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1992); Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 449 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1994); Henry v. Johnson, 450 S.E.2d 799 (W. Va.
1994); DiMagno v. DiMagno, 452 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1994).
88.
See supra note 86 for a complete list of the enumerated factors used in the
primary caretaker preference.
89. David M., 385 S.E.2d at 924.
90. Id. at 914-915. The court in David M. cites the following lower court decisions that applied a broad interpretation of the fitness requirement:
Issacs v. Issacs, 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that custody should
not be determined on apparent sexual misconduct); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 258
S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987) (finding that a lower court should place children
with the non-caretaker parent as the primary residence in a joint custody
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Clearly, the second factor of West Virginia's primary caretaker preference was not exempt from abuse of judicial discretion
despite the legislature's best intentions. In response, the court
used the case of David M. to reaffirm the enumerated factors
that define parental fitness. The court facilitated this reaffirmation by supplementing the primary caretaker preference with a
nexus requirement.
In David M., the court found the mother to be the primary
caretaker because she was more responsible for the child's daily
necessities.9 1 However, the lower court found that the mother's
sexual misconduct rendered her unfit to raise the child and
awarded the father custody even though he was not the primary
caretaker of the child.92 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals reversed this decision, restricting the lower court's consideration of parental behavior to the acts proven to have an
adverse affect upon the child.93 Thus, the appellate court required proof of a nexus between the mother's sexual misconduct
and its effect upon the child. Absent such proof, the appellate
court held that the lower court abused its discretion by finding
that the mother was an unfit parent.94
David M. demonstrates how abuses of judicial discretion can
distort the strictest of preferences. Even when the factors were
specifically enumerated and listed, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the question of parental fitness still allowed for abuses
of judicial discretion. Thus, the primary caretaker preference,
like the "best interest of the child" standard, offers no guarantee
that custody decisions will be free from abuses of judicial discretion. However, the primary caretaker preference can, like the

decision of the moral atmosphere at the caretaker's home); Bickler v.
Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986) (deciding that parental unfitness may
not be based solely upon the fact that one parent is guilty of sexual misconduct); Stacy v. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that adultery, without adverse affects upon the children is insufficient to prove parental unfitness); Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1985) (finding
that the mother's friendship with a lesbian woman does not merit a change
in custody); Mormanis v. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982) (holding
that "marijuana ...
smoked in a car in which the [mother] was at one
point present [without evidence] that the child was in the car at the time
is insufficient evidence of parental unfitness").
David M., 385 S.E.2d at 915.
91. Id. at 927.
92. Id. at 914.
93. Id. at 927.
94. Id.
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"best interest of the child standard, be supplemented by requiring a nexus between the parent's behavior and its effect upon the
child. Such supplementation can restrict a court's consideration
solely to the parent's behaviors that are proven to have an adverse effect upon the child.
III. CUSTODY STANDARDS IN MONTANA

A. The Best Interest of The Child Standard in Montana
Custody decisions in Montana are made according to the
"best interest of the child" standard, which reads:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(b) the wishes of the child as to a custodian;
(c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
child's parent or parents and siblings and any other person who
may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(d) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(e) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(f) physical abuse or threat of physical abuse by one parent
against the other parent or the child; and
(g) chemical dependency, as defined in 53-24-103, or chemical
abuse on the part of either parent."
The statutory language, "including but not limited to," does
not bind the court strictly to these factors. Moreover, the statute
neither requires one factor to be weighed more heavily than
another, nor does it require specific findings for each statutory
element listed. 6 Instead, the "best interest of the child" statute
relies upon judicial discretion. For gay and lesbian parents, this
can be devastating. In other jurisdictions, judges have abused
their discretion under this standard when gay and lesbian parents have come before the court. 7 As there is no definitive precedent from our state supreme court detailing the application of
this standard to gay and lesbian parents, the author conducted a
survey to determine how these cases are heard. 8

95.
96.
affd, In
97.
98.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1995).
In re Marriage of Arrotta, 244 Mont. 508, 513, 797 P.2d 940, 943 (1990),
re Marriage of Kovash, 260 Mont. 33, 858 P.2d 351 (1993).
See supra part II.A-B; see also supra, note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15 for an explanation regarding the author's survey.
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In light of our state's anti-homosexual law (which a district
court has just found unconstitutional under the right to privacy
afforded by Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution),9 9 the survey questioned first whether an allegation of
homosexuality might be sufficient to warrant a per se ruling of
parental unfitness. The survey indicated that judges are not
making per se decisions. Clearly, such a finding does not preclude the possibility that such rulings are made and will be
made in the future. However, this finding does suggest that in
the majority of Montana's district courts the illegal status of
homosexuals is not presently considered in custody decisions."°
This suggestion is supported by the absence of the "Deviate Sexual Conduct""' statute from the enumerated criminal convictions that can affect custody modification" 2 or visitation.103
Instead, our courts seem to consider a parent's sexual orientation
as one of many factors taken into account under the "best interest of the child" standard.1 °4
On its face, consideration of a parent's sexual orientation as
one of many factors seems appropriate. However, it is difficult to
determine if a parent's sexual orientation is viewed as a positive,
negative or neutral factor in the final custody decree. When a
judge may have reservations about homosexual parents raising
children, he or she may not make a per se ruling of parental
unfitness; yet this reservation may color the custody decision. If
a judge has such reservations, he or she clearly will not perceive
the placement of a child with a gay or lesbian parent to be in the
"best interest of the child." However, a judge may be just as

99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1995) (describing the crime of deviate sexual
conduct). At the district court level, this statute has been declared unconstitutional
based upon the right to privacy afforded under Article I, Section 10 in the Montana
Constitution. Further, although the plaintiffs asked for no remedy, the court ordered
a permanent injunction against prosecution under the statute. Gryczan v. State, No.
BVD-93-1869 (Lewis & Clark County, Feb. 16, 1996).
100. 26 of 37 courts responding to the judicial survey indicate that homosexuality is not considered a per se showing of parental unfitness. Survey of Montana District Court Judges (on file with the author). However, this survey does not reflect
the reality in every judicial district in the state. Without a complete response to the
survey, no such statement can be made, nor is suggested. However, the survey is
useful for the result that can be deduced from responding districts. For a complete
discussion of the author's survey, please see supra note 15.
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(20) (1995) (defining deviate sexual conduct).
102.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-219 (1995) (detailing the modification of custody
orders).
103.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-217 (1995) (describing visitation provisions).
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-212 (1995) (describing the "best interest of the
child" standard).
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likely to decide that no such threat of harm exists, and accordingly, he or she may not consider a parent's sexual orientation in
his or her custody decision.
Because Montana has no precedent on the issue of how our
courts should consider a parent's sexual orientation, parents may
be treated differently in different venues. This reality is illustrated in survey responses where one court ignores a parent's sexual
orientation while another court restricts visitation to periods in
which a homosexual parent's partner is not present." 5 There is
no consensus on how our courts are and should be considering
the issue of one parent's sexual orientation in contested custody
cases. When courts in other jurisdictions have abused judicial
discretion under the same custody standards,"' Montana
courts should take action to ensure that the same abuse does not
occur here.
B. The Primary CaretakerEquivalent in Montana: The
PsychologicalParent
Although Montana currently employs the "best interest of
the child" standard, our state may consider adopting another
standard in child custody decisions in light of criticism and the
broad discretion required under our current standard. °7 Just
as other jurisdictions are considering the primary caretaker
preference,'
Montana courts may be moving toward such a
consideration. Already, under subsection (c) of the "best interest
of the child" statute, Montana courts are authorized to consider
the child's primary relationships.0 9
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the Montana Supreme Court considers both the amount of child care provided
and the amount of responsibility taken by parents. In re Marriage of Nash" ° illustrates such a consideration as the court
granted sole custody to the child's mother on the basis that "she

105. Survey of Montana District Court Judges (on file with the author); see
supra note 15 for an explanation of the author's survey.
106. See discussion supra parts II.A, II.B.
107. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
108. See Leach v. Leach, 660 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); In re Maxwell,
456 N.E.2d 1218 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Commonwealth. ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448
A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Smith v. Smith, 363 S.E. 2d 404, 406 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(3)(a) (1995) (creating a rebuttable presumption
that "[c]ustody should be granted to the parent who has provided most of the primary care during the child's life.").
110. 254 Mont. 231, 836 P.2d 598 (1992).
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is the child's psychological parent and has provided for the
child's physical needs, environmental stimuli, emotional needs,
and moral development, as well as interaction with [the father's]
family and home community.""' The court, in that decision,
held that it was in the child's best interest to be placed in the
home of the primary caretaker."'
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Burleighl" the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a custody award of two minor children to
the mother based upon evidence that she was the primary person involved in their care and schooling."' Both parents in this
case were considered "fit and proper.""5 However, the court
weighed heavily the mother's status as the primary parent "involved in the care, education and rearing of the children since
their birth.""6 As in Nash, the court in Burleigh considered the
child's psychological parent or primary caretaker as a relevant
factor within the "best interest of the child" standard.
The Montana Supreme Court endorsed similar recognition of
alternative custody arrangements in In re Marriage of KE.V. "
In that case, the court recognized a non-biological father as the
presumed father of a child under the principle of equitable
estoppel."' Further, the court explicitly recognized the increase
in the numbers of families that do not reflect the traditional family."9 The court also suggested that principles of "equitable
estoppel, equitable parentage, in loco parentis, de facto parent
and psychological parent" are appropriate to accommodate the
changes within our families.'2 ° These principles recognize the
strength of the bond established over time between a caretaker
and a child. Moreover, these cases indicate that our courts already consider the roles both parents play in the day-to-day life

111. Nash, 254 Mont. at 234, 836 P.2d at 600.
112. Id. at 234, 836 P.2d at 600.
113. 200 Mont. 1, 650 P.2d 753 (1982).
114. Burleigh, 200 Mont. at 5-6, 650 P.2d at 755.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 6, 650 P.2d at 755.
117. 267 Mont. 323, 883 P.2d 1246 (1994).
118. KE.V., 267 Mont. at 330-334, 883 P.2d at 1251-1253.
119.
Id. at 330, 883 P.2d at 1251.
120. ld.; for a discussion of these principles in the context of parenthood in nontraditional families, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother Families and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (discussing not only the current
legal status of parenthood, but the new theories available to establish parenthood,
such as equitable estoppel, in loco parentis, de facto parents and psychological parents).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

23

200

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. 57

of the child. Given that the primary caretaker is already considered in our courts and the "best interest of the child" standard is
so roundly criticized, it is not unforeseeable that Montana may
move toward greater emphasis on the primary caretaker
preference.
By carefully enumerating the factors a court is to consider, a
primary caretaker preference could seemingly restrict abuses of
judicial discretion. And yet, David M. details how even a carefully enumerated primary caretaker preference can be undermined
by abuses of judicial discretion.'2 1 For gay and lesbian parents,
such abuses can mean losing custody of their children. However,
these losses can be avoided and the these abuses of judicial discretion can be contained. If Montana courts follow the David
M.' 22 decision and use a nexus requirement in conjunction with
a primary caretaker preference, the broad scope of judicial consideration that allows for such loss can be restricted.
Instead of broad authority to consider the fitness of a gay or
lesbian parent, courts using a nexus requirement in conjunction
with a primary caretaker preference will consider only those
behaviors that adversely affect the child. Thus, a parent's sexual
orientation will be beyond the scope of judicial consideration
unless it is demonstrated to adversely affect the child. Absent
such a demonstration, Montana courts will focus solely upon that
parent's involvement in his or her child's daily life. If Montana
does move to a primary caretaker preference, only a preference
applied in this way will ensure that gay and lesbian parents are
not the victims of prejudicial abuses of judicial discretion. 2 '
IV. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT IMPLICITLY REQUIRES A
NEXUS

A. In re Marriageof D.F.D.
Though there is no precedent directly on point, In re Marriage of D.F.D."' suggests that the Montana Supreme Court
implicitly required a nexus between a parent's behavior and
harm to a child. In that case, after the father and mother separated, the father filed for temporary custody of their son. 25 The

121.
David M., 385 S.E. at 927.
122.
Id. at 927-28; see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
123.
When parents fall into non-traditional categories, they are more likely to
face adversity in the courts. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
124.
261 Mont. 186, 862 P.2d 368 (1993).
125.
D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 188, 862 P.2d at 369.
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mother responded with a similar motion, and offered no affidavit
or other evidence in support of her motion other than the allegation that her husband had, in the past, cross-dressed or worn
women's undergarments. 2 '
The mother alleged that the father's conduct was a form of
sexual deviation which would be harmful to the couple's son,
were he exposed to it. 127 The district court judge in that case
acknowledged his "difficulty with the issue, largely out of ignorance, because he did not understand transvestism."'" Further,
the judge said he "would have to rely on experts... and that as
soon as he saw some expert opinion telling him he had no reason
to be concerned, he would have no reason to disbelieve that expert. 129
One expert, a psychologist, testified on the father's behalf
after conducting a series of psychological tests and a parenting
evaluation. 3 ' His results corroborated the findings of a second
expert, a psychologist and professor of psychiatry and behavioral
sciences at the University of Washington Medical School who
specialized in sexual disorders.' 3 ' Nothing in the father's psychological test results indicated that his cross-dressing affected
his effectiveness as a parent or his ability to act as a role model
to his son.'32 In addition, a third expert, Dr. Richard Green, a
psychiatrist from U.C.L.A. Medical School who had done extensive studies on the impact of parental sex roles on children,3
contributed the following findings: "[T]here was no evidence that
transvestism by a father affects parenting qualities, nor was
there any evidence that fathers who cross-dress are inclined to
sexually abuse children, any more than any other adult
male."' Further, Dr. Green pointed out that in his study of
children with sexually atypical parents, he has found no evidence
of sexual identity conflicts.'35 Finally, the opinion states that
the father felt not only ashamed of his behavior, but also assured
126. Id. at 188, 862 P.2d at 329.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 196, 862 P.2d at 374.
129. Id. at 193, 862 P.2d at 372.
130. D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 192-93, 862 P.2d at 371-72.
131. Id. at 193-94, 862 P.2d at 372-3.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Richard Green, M.D., Best Interest of The Child with a Lesbian
Mothers, 10 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 7 (1982); Richard Green, M.D., Sexual
Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, June 6, 1978 at 692.
134. D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 196, 862 P.2d at 374.
135. Id.
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the court that his cross-dressing would never be repeated.'3 6
The experts buttressed this assurance, testifying that they
thought it unlikely that the father would ever cross-dress
again."'
Despite this promise and the evidence presented which stated that such behavior presented no risk to the child, the district
court found that the father was an admitted transvestite who
might expose the parties' son to such role modeling and cause
irreparable harm.'3 8 Further, the district court found that "the
child's mental health is potentially at risk and that the child
faced irreparable sexual misidentification if he saw his father
cross-dress." 39
' Accordingly, the district court awarded sole custody to the mother and allowed the father visitation so long as it
was supervised by either the mother or an adult "non-transvestite member" of the father's family."4
The Montana Supreme Court found no credible evidence to
support the district court's finding which denied joint custody. 4 ' In fact, the court concluded:
[T]he custody and visitation arrangement ordered by the
District Court was contrary to the child's best interest and
there was no evidence, other than the District Court's unfounded

fears, to deny joint custody.... The husband's counselor, whose
testimony was undisputed, expressed the unequivocal opinion
that this man would not cross-dress in the future, that even if
he did, it would be a very private matter as it had been in the
past, and that there was no risk of observation by his son.
However, even assuming that, contrary to the counselor's expectation, the husband did cross-dress, and further assuming, contrary to all prior behavior, his cross-dressing was observed by
his son, every counselor who testified in this case testified that
the negative impact on the son would be less than the impact
from not having a normal relationship with his father.'42
The unequivocal nature of this decision clearly indicates that the
Montana Supreme Court will not look favorably upon district
courts that rely upon any unfounded fears that may be brought
into the courtroom.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 195, 862 P.2d at 374.
Id. 261 Mont. at 200, 862 P.2d at 376.
Id. at 198, 862 P.2d at 375.
D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 198, 862 P.2d at 375.
Id. at 190, 862 P.2d at 370-71.
Id. at 191, 862 P.2d at 371.
Id. at 199-200, 862 P.2d at 376 (emphasis added).
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B. In re Marriageof D.F.D. as Precedent
The opinion of the Montana Supreme Court differs sharply
from that of the district court in In re Marriage of D.F.D. This
difference demonstrates the wide discretion available under the
"best interest of the child" standard. With this discretion, the
district court disregarded the testimony and reports of the three
experts involved in the proceedings. Moreover, the district court
presumed that the father would continue cross dressing and that
this behavior would adversely affect the child. The district court
took judicial notice of this presumed "fact" despite the expert
testimony presented. Further, this "fact" once recognized by the
court, became the controlling factor of the custody decision.
Thus, this Montana district court relied upon a similar three
step process as used in the appellate courts in S.E.G.'" and
T.C.H. ", where lesbian mothers were denied custody of their
children.
In contrast, the Montana Supreme Court decision was not
controlled by any such presumed "facts." Instead, the court restricted the scope of judicial consideration to the parent's behavior as it directly affected his child. To reach this conclusion, the
court relied not upon their private biases, but upon the expertise
of psychologists, doctors and researchers. Accordingly, the decision in In re the Marriage of D.F.D. does not give legal effect to
any private biases but reflects one parent's ability to care for his
child.
In In re Marriage of D.F.D., the Montana Supreme Court
clearly articulated its view that "unfounded fears"1" have no
place in custody determinations. The court recognized this, in
part, by acknowledging the damage that can be done to
children's lives if such considerations are allowed into the courtroom and into custody decisions." Further, in that decision,
the court implicitly provided a way of limiting future abuses of
judicial discretion.
In In re Marriage of D.F.D., the Montana Supreme Court
looked to the trial court record for a connection between the
father's cross-dressing and the harm this behavior allegedly

143.
735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see notes 55-70 and accompanying
text.
144. 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
145.
D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 199, 862 P.2d at 376.
146. Id. (noting the damage done to the child by such rigid restrictions upon his
relationship with his father).
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caused the child. In doing so, the court implicitly required a
nexus between a parent's behavior and harm to the child. Upon
consideration of the evidence presented, the court found no such
nexus between the father's cross-dressing and its purported effect upon the child. Instead, there remained simply the mother's
allegations. Without support, the supreme court held that these
allegations were insufficient to establish a nexus.
The decision in In re Marriage of D.F.D. requires that there
be a nexus between a parent's behavior and harm to the child if
the behavior is to be considered under the "best interest of the
child" standard. Further, this decision demonstrates that mere
presumptions will not suffice to establish a nexus. The court in
In re Marriageof D.F.D. used a nexus requirement to narrow the
scope of judicial consideration and limit abuses of judicial discretion. This decision is analogous to decisions in other jurisdictions
where the unfounded presumptions of lower courts are exposed
at the appellate level.147 As in these other jurisdictions, our supreme court in In re Marriage of D.F.D. unequivocally stated
that such abuses of judicial discretion will not be tolerated in
Montana.
V.

SUGGESTION

A. Requiring a Nexus Between a Parent'sSexual Orientation
and Harm to the Child
In In re Marriage of D.F.D., the Montana Supreme Court
required a nexus between a parent's behavior and harm to the
child. This decision reflects how our courts should consider custody cases involving homosexual parents. In contrast, the trial
court decision demonstrates the risk to homosexual parents if
Montana courts do not require a nexus if similar allegations of
harm are raised. The father's cross-dressing caused the trial
court to question, to disregard expert testimony, and to rely upon
its own presumptions of harm. Further, the trial court took judicial notice of this presumed harm and found that the child's
"mental health was potentially at risk and that the child faced
irreparable sexual misidentification .... ""
Similar concerns are raised about homosexual parents and
the effect their sexual orientation might have upon their chil-

147.
148.

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 197, 862 P.2d at 374.
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dren.'49 Just as the father deviated from what is considered
characteristic of a father, gay and lesbian parents deviate from
the notions of who men and women should traditionally love.
This difference, as seen in other jurisdictions, may cause courts
to question, to disregard expert testimony or credible evidence,
and to presume that this difference will cause harm to the child.
If a court takes judicial notice of such a presumption, it can
control a custody decision and preclude a court awarding custody
to a gay or lesbian parent.15
Presumptions regarding gay and lesbian parents can prompt
courts to abuse the broad judicial discretion afforded under the
"best interest of the child" standard. In In re Marriage of D.F.D.,
our state supreme court recognized that decisions based upon
such presumptions have no place in our custody decisions. Thus,
when homosexual parents, by the nature of their difference, may
prompt such unwarranted presumptions, our courts must take
action.
B. Practicality:Using a Nexus Requirement
The decision in In re Marriage of D.F.D. provides a test for
courts when one parent alleges that another parent's sexual
orientation threatens or harms the child. In In re Marriage of
D.F.D., the court evaluated the credibility and sufficiency of the
evidence offered to support the allegation that the father's behavior adversely affected the son. 5 ' Ultimately, the Montana
Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
establish a nexus between the father's behavior and harm to the
' Absent credible and sufficient evidence to establish a
child. 52
nexus between the alleged harm and the father's behavior, the,
court found that the trial court abused its discretion."
By following the In re Marriage of D.F.D. decision, courts
are provided with a pattern of inquiry if similar allegations arise
involving a parent's sexual orientation:
1) If a party in a contested custody case alleges that a
parent's sexual orientation causes harm to the child, the court
must consider:
a) the credibility of the evidence presented,
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See supra notes 2 and 11.
See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text
D.F.D., 261 Mont. at 192-200, 862 P.2d at 371-377.
Id. at 200, 862 P.2d at 377.
Id. at 200, 862 P.2d at 377.
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b) and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a
nexus between a parent's sexual orientation and direct
harm to the child.
2) If the evidence is credible and sufficient to establish a
nexus between a parent's sexual orientation and direct harm to
the child, then a court is within it's discretion to consider a
parent's sexual orientation under the "best interest of the child"
standard as one of the relevant factors in the custody decision."5
Thus, if one parent in a contested custody case alleges that a
parent's sexual orientation threatens or harms a child, a court
using this test will first consider the credibility of the evidence
presented. This requires a court to consider whether the evidence
presented is a mere presumption or a substantiated fact. 55 The
court in In re Marriage of D.F.D. is instructive on this point,
relying upon the expert testimony of three specialists.'5 6 Further, the Supreme Court in Palmore reminds Montana courts
that although there may be credible evidence of substantial bias
or intolerance, courts cannot take judicial notice of presumptions
that such intolerance will result in harm to the child. To ensure
that Montana courts do not give legal effect to private biases, 5 v
Montana courts cannot allow such presumptions of "fact" to control custody decisions. Therefore, to satisfy the first prong of the
test, the evidence presented to support the allegation of harm
must be demonstrably credible and must indicate more than
mere bias or intolerance.
If the evidence presented does not meet this criteria, then
the court shall not consider the parent's sexual orientation as a
relevant factor in the custody decision. Any consideration of the
parent's sexual orientation in the absence of credible evidence
constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion. However, if the evidence is credible and indicates more than mere prejudice or bias,
the court is then obligated to consider whether the evidence is

154. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1995) (detailing all of the factors courts are
to consider under the "best interest of the child" standard).
155. See S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (relying upon a
presumption that the gay parent presented a threat to her child).
156. D.F.D., 261 Mont. 182, 862 P.2d 368 (1993) (relying upon scientific evidence,
studies and reports to determine that a father who cross-dressed presented no threat

to his son).
157. See Palmore, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) for a discussion of the Supreme
Court prohibition on giving legal effect to private biases.
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sufficient to prove a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and alleged harm to the child.
To meet the sufficiency requirement, the evidence presented
must not only be credible, but must also demonstrate that the
parent's sexual orientation directly causes harm to the child.
Essentially, this requires that the party alleging harm prove, by
the credible evidence presented, that a nexus exists. In re Marriage of D.F.D., the Montana Supreme Court considered expert
testimony to determine whether a nexus existed between the
father's behavior and the alleged harm to the child. For each
allegation raised, the court considered the credibility of the evidence and whether it could sufficiently establish a nexus between the alleged harm and the father's behavior.
Similarly, any court using this proposed test will require
proof of a nexus for each allegation raised. Each side will offer
evidence to support or refute the allegation; further, like in In re
Marriage of D.F.D., the court will weigh the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence to determine if a nexus exists. If the evidence is not sufficient to prove a direct nexus between a parent's
sexual orientation and the alleged harm, the court will not consider a parent's sexual orientation as a relevant factor in the
custody decision.
However, if the evidence presented is both credible and sufficient to prove a direct nexus between a parent's sexual orientation and the alleged harm to the child, then a court will be within its proper discretion to consider a parent's sexual orientation
as a relevant factor in its custody decision."' 8 This authorization does not empower a court to construe one parent's sexual
orientation as the sole determining factor in a custody decision.
A court must consider any harm proven to be the direct result of
a parent's sexual orientation as one of the many relevant factors
a court is authorized to consider within the "best interest of the
child" standard.' 9 Obviously, if the harm is grave, it could be
the decisive factor, but its presence alone does not preclude the
possibility that this parent could still be awarded custody. This
test, when applied as discussed, purports to ensure that one
parent's sexual orientation will not disadvantage that parent,
unless, by credible and sufficient evidence this parent's sexual

158. However, such a finding is unlikely given studies that consistently show
that children raised by homosexual parents are not adversely affected by that
parent's sexual orientation. See supra note 11 and 58.
159. See supra part III.A for a complete discussion of all of the relevant factors
considered under the "best interest of the child" standard.
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orientation causes direct harm to the child.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Gay and lesbian parents are our neighbors, our friends and
our co-workers in Montana. And these parents are in our courtrooms, struggling for custody of their children. Their struggle
may be made easier by the recent district court decision in
Gryczan v. State which declared the "Deviate Sexual Conduct"
statute unconstitutional under the right to privacy afforded by
Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.16 ° Although
this decision may affect the way some courts view gay and lesbian parents, Montana courts will still determine custody under
the "best interest of the child" standard. As demonstrated by
case law in our own state and that of other jurisdictions using
this same standard, the "best interest of the child" standard
offers gay and lesbian parents no security from abuses of judicial
discretion. In light of the criticism this standard has received, a
primary caretaker preference might seem a reasonable alternative. However, not even this standard, with its careful enumerations, is immune from abuses of judicial discretion. Neither standard offers gay and lesbian parents any assurance that they will
be judged on their ability to parent rather than their sexual
orientation.
The Montana Supreme Court recognized the devastating
effect abuses of judicial discretion can have upon the lives of
children of sexual minorities. Accordingly, our state supreme
court urges Montana's lower courts to move beyond their "unfounded fears" and toward decisions that accurately determine
which parent is best able to care for his or her children. To heed
our state supreme court, Montana courts must require a nexus
between a parent's sexual orientation and harm to the child before they may consider a parent's sexual orientation as a relevant factor in a custody decision.
Such a requirement might have assured my grandmother
that a court would consider her care and concern for her children. Such a requirement can offer this assurance now. For my
grandmother, for every lesbian and gay parent who has followed,
and for every child, our courts must finally answer the question
my grandmother's life presented more than forty-four years ago.
To respect her life and parenting, our courts must firmly refuse
160. Gryczan v. State, No. BVD-93-1869 (Lewis & Clark County, Feb. 16, 1996);
see supra note 16 for a discussion of the recent Gryzcan decision.
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to consider a parent's sexual orientation in the absence of a proven nexus. Only such a definitive answer to the question my
grandmother's life presented will assure that custody decisions
involving homosexual parents in our state will not be predicated
upon "unfounded fears." Only then will we, as a state, move
closer to decisions that truly reflect the "best interest of the
child."y
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